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1. General remarks 
In my paper I would like to present some cases, in which in our modern understanding 
one's action formally constitutes iniuria as it involves occidere, described in the first 
chapter of the Lex Aquilia' and urere frangere rumpere, described in chapter 3. What is 
more, from the subjective aspect the action is intentional, nevertheless it is justifiable. 
Although the modern terminology of criminal law cannot always be applied in the 
historical perspective,' I would like to show that ancient Roman Law includes cases for 
which modern criminal theory says that an action may formally be unlawful, but for 
some reasons, constructed by law, the material side of unlawfulness is missing, so in the 
end, the action, although it caused injury or damage — probably even homocide — is 
justified. These reasons — accepting the typology of Nagy Ferenc and Tokaji Géza 3 — 
basically fall into three cathegories. 
Firstly, the defended interest is considerably more valuable than the one it collides 
with and in such situations law gives priority to the more valuable interest. This is the 
reason for the legal construction of inevitable necessity. 
Secondly there are cases, where legal defence is not necessary, because the disponent 
of the legal object does not require such defence, he takes the risk of injury or damage in 
his property or his bodily integrity. In modern terminology this is known as the consent 
given by the injured and for which there are several cases in The Digest. 
Thirdly, there are situations, where it is impossible to list the conflicting interests. 
So, after all, the reasons excluding unlawfulness may be based on overwhelming, 
missing, or equal interests. 
Szerző azonos azzal az Orosz Gáborral, aki a Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kara 
kiadványai Publicationes Doctorandorum Juridicorum sorozatának 1. Tomusában (Fasc. 18.) Anglia és a 
római jog címmel közölt tanulmányt. Nevébe a megkülönböztető  betűjelzést ezt követően vette fbl. (A szerk.) 
For a general introduction of the Lex Aquilia see H. HAUSMANINGER: Das Schadenersatzrecht der Lex 
Aquilia, Wien, 1990.; FRITZ SCHULTZ: Classical Roman Law. Oxford, 1951. pp. 587-592; FOLD! ANDRÁS 
and HAMZA GÁBOR: A római jog története és institúciói. Budapest. 1996. pp. 555-558; FARKAS LAJOS: A 
római jog történelme (Alapintézmények az elso alakulás szerint). Kolozsvár, 1906. pp. 399-407, BUCKLAND 
MCNAIR: Roman and Common Law (A Comparison in Outline). Cambridge, 1936. p. 302. 
2 MOLNÁR  IMRE: A jogellenesség és vétkesség kérdése a római jogban. In: Tanulmányok Benedek Ferenc 
tiszteletére, Pécs, 1996. p.209. About contractual and delictual liability in Roman Law, see  MOLNÁR IMRE: A 
iómai jog felelősségi rendje. Szeged, 1993. 
3 NAGY FERENC — TOKAJI GÉZA: A magyar bfintetojog általános része. Szeged, 1998. p. 147. 
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Since Roman Law mainly developed as case-law, lawyers — being true to their 
practical way of legal thinking' — did not set up the dogmatic framework of the above-
mentioned reasons of justification, but in the light of the presented cases, it is beyond 
doubt that they constructed the criteria.for the exclusion of unlawfulness 
2. The reasons excluding unlawfulness in Roman sources 
There are several cases in roman sources, where — as Prof.  Molnár points out in his 
essay in honour of Prof. Benedeks - unlawfulness was excluded, although occidere or 
urere frangere rumpere are apparent. 
Paulus says that (D.9,2,45,4) vim enim vi defendere omnes leges omniaque  jura 
permittunt. 
So those who do damage because they cannot otherwise defend themselves are 
blameless, for all laws and legal systems allow one to use force to defend oneself against 
violence. 
According to Ulpian (D.47,10,13,1) is qui lure public° utitur, non videtur iniuriae 
faciendae causa hoc facere. 
A person, who does something for the public good, will not be treated as having 
done it with a view to affront, for there is no wrong in such an act. 
Ulpian writes the following: (D.46,10,1,5) quia nulla iniuria est, quae in volentem 
fiat. 
This is the case of consent. 
Ulpian: (D.9,2,7,4) quia gloria causa et virtus non iniuriae gratia videtur damnum 
datum. 
If a man kills another in the collucatio or in the pancratum or in a boxing match, 
(provided that one kills the other in a public bout) the Lex Aquilia does not apply 
because the damage is seen to be done in the case of glory and valor and not for the sake 
of inflicting unlawful harm. 
Ulpian (D.9,2,9,4) At sport events the unavoidable conduct of the injured can also 
exclude iniuria. The typical case from The Digest, is: when other people were 
already throwing javelins in afield and a slave walked across the same field and 
he was killed, the Aquilian action fails, because he should not make his way at 
an inopportune time across afield, where javelin throwing is being practised 6 
There is a special provision of law about the thief caught at night (Gai. D.9,2,4,1) 
The Law of the Twelve Tables permits one to kill a thief caught in the night, 
provided, one gives evidence of the fact by shouting aloud, but someone may 
only kill a person caught in such circumstances at any other time, if he defends 
himself, with a weapon, though only if he provides evidence by shouting. 
4 PÓLAY ELEMÉR: A rómaijogászok gondolkodásmódja. Budapest, 1988. p. 207. 
5 
 
MOLNÁR: Jogellenesség... pp. 219-220. 
6 For further analysis of the case see MoLNAR: A római jog felelősségi rendje. p. 132. 
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• We can find cases of emergency in The Digest. Some of them are so called fire 
cases, (D.43,24,7,4) others involve ships getting caught in vessels and trying to 
escape (D.9,2,29,3). 
Trying to fulfill the requirements I set to myself with the title of this paper, in the 
following my main goal is to compare the Roman rules of justifiable self defence and 
inevitable necessity' and the applicable rules of the Hungarian Criminal Code (Btk.) 
3. Self-defence 
According to the Hungarian Criminal Code: 
The person, whose act is necessary for the prevention of an unlawful attack against 
that person, his own goods, or those of other persons, or against the public interest, 
or of an unlawful attack menacing directly the above, shall not be punishable. [Btk., 
Section 29, Par. (1)] 
It is evident, that this principle originally stems from the vim vi repellere postulate, 
which says : vim vi repellere cuique licet. This axiomatical rule was handled by Roman 
lawyers as part of the ius naturale, as well as the ius gentium.8 lus naturale est quod 
natura omnia animailia docuit, which means that the law of natural reason covers the 
rules, that seem evident by natural reason for every human being. 
Taking the situation of self defence into consideration, it is a typical example for the 
ius naturale, where the instinct of protecting one's life or property from an unlawful 
attack, using violence can be justified. This means that for the time of acting in self 
defence, the defending person is in some ways beyond the general princples of law, in 
other words, natural instinct comes first in such a situation. 
In the case of self defence there is violence on both sides, but only one side is 
unlawful. 9 So to be more precise, there is an unlawful position against a lawful one. This 
is the case in The Digest, when A stabs B's slave, who is lying in ambush to rob him to 
death. (Gai.D.9,2,4 pr.) 
If! kill your slave, who is lying in ambush to rob me, I shall go free, for natural 
reason permits a person to defend himself against danger. 
So, as it is the case today, lawful self-defence provided a position to disregard the 
requirements of law in defence of one's life. But there must be very strict limits to this 
beneficial legal situation, and such limits are carefully drawn in modern criminal codes 
and by modern criminal theory. 
Accepting the modern theoretical limits of self defence as a framework, let us 
consider, which criteria are outlined for the person causing harm in self-defence in 
Roman Law. 
7. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN: The Law of Obligations. Cape Town, Wetton, Johannesburg, 1990. pp. 
998-1004; ANDREAS WACKE: Defence and necessity in Aquilian Liability. 1987. 20 De Jure 83 sqq. 
0 .43,16,1,27: Vim vi repellere licere Cassius scribit, idque ius natura comparatur. See WACKE: op. 
cit. p. 383 for the phylosophical background of the vim vi repellere principle. 
9 NAGY — TOKAJI: op. cit. p. 149., MAKAI LAJOS and TARR JÓZSEF: Vázlat a Büntető Törvénykönyv 
(1978. évi IV törvény) általános részének a bírósági fogalmazóképzés keretében történő megbeszéléséhez. 
Budapest, 1997. p. 26. 
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Self-defence can only be justiJied between the offender and the defender. If innocent 
others get involved self-defence is no more lawful. Paulus says (D.9,2,45,4): ...if in 
order to defend myself 1 throw a stone at my attacker, and 1 hit not him, but a 
passer-by, /shall be liable under the Lex Aquilia, for it is permitted only to use force 
against an attacker. 
In respect of the third innocent party involved, obviously lawful self-defence cannot be 
applied so there is iniuria in respect of the passer-by, who is in a lawful position as well 
as the defender, and modern law would most probably apply the rules for inevitable 
necessity to this situation. Another condition to the application of lawful self-defence is 
that it should be imminent. Roman Law follows this principle, because it considers force 
used against the attacker after the attack revenge, rather than self-defence. The above 
quoted section from Paulus continues: ...and even then only so far as it is necessary for 
self-defence and not for revenge. 
Another vitally important criterion of the lack of liability is that the chosen form of 
defence must be necessary under the given circumstances. 
This sets two requirements towards the person in defence. The means has to be in 
proportion with the attack and if in the given situation there are several possible ways to 
avert the attack, the mildest has to be chosen. Naturally, proportionality . cannot be 
universally defined, it should be verified in each and every case with careful attention of 
all the specific conditions. Nevertheless there is a universal principle, that if one's life is 
threatened, one is allowed to kill the attacker. With respect to proportionality there is an 
important rule in the Digest under Ulpian's name: 
(D.9,2,5) If someone kills anyone else, who is trying to go for him with a sword, he 
will not be deemed to have killed unlawfully and ffor fear of death someone kills a 
thief there is no doubt, that he will not be liable under the Lex Aquilia. But if 
although he could have arrested him, he preferred to kill him, the better opinion is, 
that he should be deemed to have acted unlawfully (iniuria), and therefore he will 
also be liable under the Lex Cornelia. 
In this last case the person acting in self-defence failed to apply the principle of 
proportionality, because he could have chosen a milder way to protect himself. 
Another example, where proportionality holds, is (Alf D9,2,52,I) when a 
shopkeeper placed a lantern above his display counter and a passer-by took it down and 
carried it off. The shopkeeper went after him calling for his lantern , soon a brawl 
developed, in which the thief began to hit the shopkeeper with his whip with a spike on 
it, with which the shopkeeper pricked the eye of the thief. Alfenus says, that if the 
shopkeeper was provoked by the thief, the defence was proportionate, but if he had been 
the one to hit first, he would appear to be accountable for the loss of the eye. 
In connection with proportionality modern criminal codes tolerate the special 
psychological and emotional status of the person acting in self defence, who can be 
frightened and overwhelmed by the attack. 
The Hungarian Criminal Code says: 
That person shall not be punishable either, who exceeds the necessary measure of 
prevention because he is unable to recognize it due to fright or justifiable 
excitement. The punishment may be mitigated without limitation, if the perpetrator is 
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restricted in recognizing the necessary degree of prevention by fright or justifiable 
excitement. [Btk. Section 29, Par. (2) and (3)] 
If we take a close look at the second case mentioned in the text of Ulpian, cited above, it 
is apperant that the applicability of the Lex Aquilia failed when it was proven that the 
person acting in self defence exceeded the requirements of proportionality for fear of 
death (...et si metu quis mortis furem occident...). 
• In summary we can establish, that from The Digest of Justinian it is obvious, that all 
the principles, that are followed in modern criminal law concerning self-defence, were 
already outlined by Roman lawyers. Once again they are: (1) the unlawfulness of the 
attack, (2) the imminence and (3) the necessity of the defence, including the criteria of 
(3/a) proportionality and (3/b) the obligation to choose the mildest way of defence. 
Self-defence can only be justified on behalf of the person who had been attacked if all 
these elements concur. 
4. Necessity 
In the next part of my talk I would like to focus on the question of necessity as 
another kind of justification. In the Hungarian Criminal Code, under Btk. Section 30, 
Par. (I), necessity is defined in the following way: 
The person who rescues his own person or goods or the person or goods of other 
people from a direct danger otherwise not preventable, or acts so in the defence of 
the public interest, shall not be punishable, provided that the occurrence of the 
danger is not imputable to him and his act causes a smaller injury than that for the 
prevention of which he made efforts. 
While in the case of lawful self-defence there is unlawfulness against lawfulness, in the 
case of necessity there is a lawful position on both sides. As far as modern legal systems 
are concerned, the question arises, whether necessity excludes unlawfulness or only 
wrongfulness of the action. 
The construct of the Hungarian Criminal Code only applies if inflicting minor injury 
averts a more serious one, because diverting the danger to some other person in a lawful 
position, brings about social benefit only in this case. The Swiss Criminal Code for 
example considers necessity as an exclusion of wrongfulness. And finally the German 
Criminal Code defines necessity excluding unlawfulness and wrongfulness separately.'° 
In one of these cases (D.9,2,29,3) Labeo writes, that 
when a ship was blown by the force of the wind into the anchor ropes of another 
vessel and the sailors cut the ropes, no action should be allowed, if the vessel cvould 
be extricated in no other way, than by severing the ropes. In another case both 
Labeo and Proculus thought the same about fishermen's nets in which a fishing boat 
got caught. 
1 `)  About the legal nature of necessity in an intematonal comparison see NAGY - TOKAJI: op. cit. pp. 155— 
156. 
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There are in fact two cases related to necessity presented by Ulpian. In the first one a 
boat was carried away by the wind and then tangled into the ropes of another ship. The 
crew of the boat entrapped cut the ropes but because it was the only possible way to save 
the boat, we cannot consider it illegal. 
In the second case, which seems fairly similar, Proculus agreed with Labeo that if a 
fishing boat gets entangled in the nets of another one, and the crew can only free the 
boat by cutting the net, they cannot be held liable under the Lex Aqulia, provided that 
the crew had not caused the emergency. 
In these cases Roman lawyers acknowledged necessity as a reason for excluding 
unlawfulness for the benefit of the person causing the damage. 
If we are to draw a comparison between Roman law and present day legal practises, 
we should pay more attention to the conditions of establishing extreme necessity as they 
appear in the cited text. 
The Hungarian Criminal Code — as it was shown in the case of justifiable self 
defence — prescribes that the emergency should be direct. Emergency can be considered 
direct if it threatens certain people or possessions and if the injury would possibly 
shortly ensue, provided that delaying the interference would make the prevention of the 
harmful result unlikely. It is beyond any doubt, that in both of the above cited cases of 
the Digest the two entrapped boats are threatened by imminent and direct danger. 
Moreover in the first case the crew are probably indangered, too, because the high winds 
point to the possibility of shipwreck. 
In the first case the source of danger is the force of the wind (vis venti), which can be 
considered as vis maior in relation to liabilty (i.e. none can be held responsible) 
provided, however that the captain and the crew had taken every effort they were 
expected to take in order to avoid taking unnecessary risks. 
When discussing the case, Wacke remarks that although there was no official 
weather forecast in Roman times, an experienced sailor was able to infer whether a 
storm was likely to break out, if he examined the skies» 
Searching for the cause of the emergency situation, besides vis maior it is necessary 
to examine the possibility of imperitia, as a specific form of cu/pa, which in this certain 
case means, that the captain might have decided not to sail on the basis of his expertise, 
experience and the insight expected of him, as a prudent and professional person.' 2 
The lack of responsibility in the infliction of the source of danger was an essential 
condition to the exemption from liability, as our text points out: ...plane si cu/pa 
nautarum id factum esset, lege Aquilia agendum. 
The other issue to be examined when identifiing inevitable necessity, is the nature of 
the fending act. As we saw above Hungarian criminal law admits the necessity of such 
an act if the danger is imminent and cannot be fended in any other way. 
Looking at the cited cases of the fishing boats, there is no need to prove the 
imminence of the danger, as it was discussed above. Ulpian describes the latter 
requirement as follows: nullo alio modo... explicare se potuit. Hereby he mentiones the 
requirement of the necessity of the act, which was an essential condition to justifiable 
self defence as well. In our modern understanding it means that a person engaging in 
I I WACKE: op. cit. p. 394. 
12  For the introduction of imperitia and infirmitas, as the two special forms of culpa see MOLNÁR: A 
római jog felelősségi rendje. pp. 163-166. 
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inevitable necessity carries out a formally illegal act, which however is necessary for 
avoiding danger, either because this is the only solution, or there may be other solutions, 
but they are for some reason are not applicable in the certain situation (e.g. they are less 
effective, or because delay would lead to more danger or to the direct possibility of the 
injury). 
In the cases discussed the criterion of necessity holds, since cutting the ropes of the 
other ship, or the fishing net seems to be the only possible way of freeing the entangled 
boat. 
It follows from the above that the person acting in inevitable necessity to fend off 
imminent danger is engaged in a deliberate act, to be precise his act is dolorous as a 
result of which — as we have seen — certain damage or grievance is inflicted. There is 
however one more condition to the exemption from liability, which, according to the 
Hungarian Criminal Code is that the preventive measure should inflict less harm, than 
the danger it was ment to avert would have done. 
It is beyond any doubt that in the Roman cases cited the value of the fishing net or 
the ropes chould not have been compared to the value of the boat entangled, let alone 
the life of the crew, also endangered by the storm. 
A ship constitutes far more value so necessity stands. In this case the crew of the 
vessel are not responsible for getting trapped and in their efforts to save the ship they 
were lawfully acting in a case of inevitable necessity, so any action under the Lex 
Aquilia would fail. 
From the presented cases one has the impression that Roman lawyers looked at the 
conditions of inevitable necessity in a very similar manner to our modern understanding, 
concerning both the causes of the emergency and the means of the fending act as well as 
the legally acceptable results of such an act. 
And now let us turn our attention to a case described in The Digest and consider the 
approach of Roman lawyers to inevitable necessity. In the case, where A pulls down his 
neighbour's house in order to save his own, we cannot say, that he applies lawful self-
defence, since his neighbour did not inflict any unlawful attack on him. Nevertheless his 
action is not necessarily unlawful, because he acts in a case of emergency. 
Necessity involves a hard choice between competing values, and a sacrifice of one to 
the other. This means, that the neighbour loses his house through A's action, although he 
himself did not commit any unlawfulness. 
Naturally as is the case in lawful self-defence, the lack of unlawfulnes can only be 
established under certain special circumstances. The question of these circumstances 
was disputed among Roman lawyers. There are two possible ways to approach the 
problem. 
First, if we examine the circumstances from an ex post facto point of view, pulling 
down the house is not unlawful, provided the fire in fact reached the neighbour's piece 
of land. Servius prefered this opinion (D.43,24,4,7). 
Celsus approaches the case differently. He takes A's perspective, when he says 
(D.9,2,49) that there is no action under the Lex Aquilia, because he pulled down the 
adjoining house in the reasonable fear that the fire would reach his own house. 
The Hungarian Criminal Code also takes reasonable fear into account under Btk. 
Section 30, Par. (2) and (3), where it says that: 
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That person is not punishable either, who causes an injury of the same or greater 
extent than the one for the prevention of which he made efforts, because he is unable 
to recognize the magnitude of the injury due to fright or justifiable excitement. 
The punishment may be mitigated without limitation, if fright or justifiable 
excitement restricts the perpetrator in the recognition of the magnitude of the injury. 
However, we should note, that the solution for the fire cases given by Roman 
jurisprudence cannot be applied generally for all cases. We can easily say that the 
neighbour's house was barely protected by the provisions of law. 
But before we come to that hasty conclusion, we must take a short look at 
contemporary housing conditions. In some estates of ancient Rome houses were built 
extremely close to each other, so a fire could make devastating damage in these areas. 
Only August established the body of the vigiles, who acted partly like a fire 
brigade." So in this context a special approach is required, since, without a fire brigade 
anyone who had the courage to fight the fire must have been handled as a local hero, 
risking his own life in order to save the lives and properties of other people. In the above 
shown fire case we can say, that the neighbour was not only acting in necessity, but 
furthermore, he was causing damage in order to save the public interest as well, which in 
our modern legal understanding is an accepted reason for excluding material 
unlawfulness by itself. 
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JOGOS VÉDELEM ÉS VÉGSZÜKSÉG A RÓMAI JOGBAN ÉS A 
MAGYAR BÜNTETŐ TÖRVÉNYKÖNYVBEN 
A dolgozat olyan tényállásokat mutat be a Lex Aquilia által szabályozott esetkörből, 
melyeknél a törvény első részében szereplő occidere, illetve a harmadik részben 
szabályozott urere ftangere rumpere, vagy dologrongálás formálisan megvalósul, de a 
szándékos elkövetés ellenére  sem kerül megállapításra a cselekmény jogellenessége. 
A szerző célja e jogesetek bemutatásán keresztül a történeti jogösszehasonlítás 
módszerének segítségül hívásával annak bizonyítása, hogy a római jog ismerte azokat a 
szituációkat, melyekben a modern büntetőjogi dogmatika azt mondja, hogy  bár az adott 
cselekmény formailag jogellenes, a materiális jogellenesség bizonyos, a jog által 
konstruált okok alapján mégis hiányzik. Az elkövető felelősségre vonása  tehát elmarad 
annak ellenére, hogy megölt valakit, vagy más súlyos sérelmet okozott. 
Hangsúlyozandó, hogy a római jogi kazuisztikában nem találjuk meg tehát a 
jogellenességet kizáró okok dogmatikai rendszerét, mégis a jogesetek fényében rendkí-
vül tanulságos áttekinteni, hogy a római jogászok milyen kritériumok fennállta esetén 
állapították meg a jogellenesség  hiányát. 
13 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica CD ROM 1998, there was a devastating fire raging in 
Rome in 6. ad. This had led to the establishment of the body of the vigiles, as part of many reforms of 
August. 
Self-defence and Necessity in Roman Law and in the Hungarian Criminal Code — 185 
A jogellenességet kizáró okok római jogi rendszerének felvázolását követően a 
dolgozat a jogos védelem és a végszükség szabályozásának mikéntjét teszi részletes 
vizsgálat tárgyává. 
Az idevágó kázusok elemzése eredményeként levonható az a  következtetés, hogy a 
modern büntetőjog által elfogadott alapvető követelmények a jogos  védelem megálla-
pításával kapcsolatban mar a római jogászok számára ismertek voltak, nevezetesen: (1) 
jogos védelmi helyzet csak a támadó irányában  állhat fenn, (2) a támadás jogellenes-
sége, a védekezés (3) azonnalisága, és (4) szükségessége, ami  magában foglalja (4/a) az 
arányosság és (4/b) a lehető legenyhébb elhárítási mód választásának követel-ményét. 
A végszükség tekintetében a dolgozat szerzője azt a konklúziót vonja le, hogy a 
római jogászok a mai felfogásunkhoz nagyon hasonlóan látták a végszükség 
megállapíthatóságának feltételeit mind a veszélyhelyzet keletkezése, mind pedig az 
elhárító cselekmény és annak a jog által még tolerálható következményei tekintetében. 
Végül a dolgozat egy némileg speciális, és a római jogtudósok körében sem 
egységesen megítélt, tűzvésszel kapcsolatos jogesetet mutat be, melynek  megoldása 
mind a végszükség, mind a köz érdekében történt károkozás szabályainak segítségül 
hívásával elképzelhető. 
- 
